The Third Eye: 'Tailored' Intelligence serves no purpose

New Delhi, Aug 3 (IANS) Intelligence by definition is reliable information that tells you ‘what lies ahead’, pointing to the ‘risks’ facing a nation or an organisational entity and also in the process indicating the ‘opportunities’ that could be availed of- in either case, it helps the policy formulation and knowledge-based decision-making.

Intelligence does not dictate policy, but the ruling dispensation ought not to disregard it- for its own good. The first requirement of intelligence is that the accuracy of information that it conveyed should never be in doubt.

Strangely, the files declassified for the 2016 Presidential election described the Intelligence on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interest in favour of Donald Trump as being of a ‘substandard’ variety- there was no such classification of Intelligence which had to be either taken in as ‘reliable’ or discarded.

The national Intelligence agencies of India had the tradition of seeking an ‘independent’ corroboration of information before it was furnished by them as Intelligence. They would- in the event of information being of such importance that it could not be withheld- pass it on, provided they were totally convinced of its reliability. Normally information of this kind was conveyed with the tag ‘reliable but unconfirmed’. Failure to communicate Intelligence to the right quarters, even when information was available, is regarded as an inexcusable lapse, for it might cause a total failure of national security. The only other reason for a failure of this kind would be the lack of ‘response to available Intelligence’ from the action takers.

Intelligence is essentially ‘information for action’ and in this equation, Intelligence agencies and the machinery of the government responsible for action, stand on the same footing as far as ‘accountability’ for failure goes.

There is no compromise with the principles on which Intelligence is collected and furnished to the powers that be. Intelligence is information about a potential threat to the security, unity and sovereignty of the nation, in the judgement of the Intelligence provider- and it should be conveyed to those who govern the country, without loss of time.

In a democratic dispensation based on electoral politics, those at the head of the government are sensitive to information that would possibly lead to a critique of whether they had competently responded to a potential threat. They may like to have more information that promotes their image. The regime may like to have only what was ‘good news’ from its own perspective, and the worst that can happen to the management of Intelligence is that it should be in the hands of those who did not mind reporting to the rulers what the latter ‘would like to hear’. This kind of degradation of Intelligence would be noticed more in autocratic regimes.

An Intelligence organisation is one instrument that enables the ruling elite to know what is happening inside the country and who the nation’s friends and adversaries are in the international community at a given point in time. Why should the rulers mind what was reported to them in confidence? They would in fact, be happy to get a chance to use Intelligence for course correction at the policy level, should it become necessary.

It is said that Russian President Putin’s unwavering belief that Ukraine would swiftly capitulate, apparently based on security assessments, turned out to be an unprecedented Intelligence failure. To what extent these assessments were influenced by Putin’s strong wishful thinking is anybody’s guess. As regards US, an authoritarian approach of President Donald Trump to Intelligence, rooted in his populist, strong-minded and personalised style, led him to run down Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard’s Congressional testimony to the effect that Iran was not yet close to developing a nuclear weapon.

Trump was not prepared to give any latitude to Iran on the latter’s claim that its programme was only for nuclear energy, as the US President, he was entitled to make it a part of the US policy on the Middle East. After he sent bombers to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities- and allowed bunker buster bombs to be dropped on the nuclear plant at Fordow buried deep under a mountain outside of Tehran- he contended that the sites were ‘totally destroyed’ even though the preliminary report of his own Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) said that severe damage was caused to the sites but they were not ‘obliterated’.

Trump cannot perhaps be faulted for ‘exaggerating’ the claim because from the American point of view, the extensive bombing of nuclear establishments of Iran, in any case, was the essence of US policy towards that country. This is perhaps why Tulsi Gabbard and CIA chief John Ratcliffe upheld President Trump’s stand after a ‘further examination of the developments’.

Intelligence is not a one-time event of reporting on a threat, but is now a part of the mainstream of national governance. It helps policy formulation but also to an extent monitors the impact and execution of policy, empowered by the belief that Intelligence always worked for safeguarding national interests.

Working in close concert with the ruling elite and accepting legitimate ‘tasking’ by the government should not lead to the Intelligence set-up coming under an undue influence of political leadership and sliding into complacency about its responsibilities. Moreover, experience, merit and seniority should count for the assignment of senior responsibilities in the Intelligence set-up.

In the Indian context, there have been only two occasions after Independence for lateral entry at the level of Chief of Intelligence, one was totally on merit and the incumbent was exceptionally successful, while in the second case, there was political favouritism that explained the mediocrity of performance on the part of the chief.

Intelligence is not like any other function of the government- it requires a certain basic training, acceptance of anonymity as a work philosophy and willingness to work hard without ‘fear of failure’.

Fortunately for India, our national Intelligence agencies have evolved very well to handle their comprehensive role of safeguarding national security and sovereignty competently.

There is a need to maintain the fundamentals of Intelligence work regarding personal discipline, public responsibility and a national outlook. The Intelligence organisation decides what is an impending threat to the nation and does not wait for any political clearance to start handling it.

The Intelligence officer had an astute understanding of the fact that ‘all Intelligence is information but all information is not intelligence’. The delineation of Intelligence into Internal, External and Technical spheres has made coordination among the agencies an extremely important issue- all pieces of Intelligence must congregate at a point of national apex so that an integral assessment of the total picture is made possible and no information is allowed to be ‘lost in transit’. The institutions of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and National Security Advisor (NSA) have acquired special importance for this reason.

An Intelligence assessment must be unambiguous, free of subjective opinion or personal bias and guided totally by the call of national unity and sovereignty. It should be amenable to course correction in the light of new Intelligence coming in, since the security situation was never static. Finally, there is a moot point about the responsibility of the Agency chief to get the legacy of Intelligence management going, on the understanding that the established principles for the Intelligence function had an unbroken continuity.

(The writer is a former Director Intelligence Bureau)

--IANS

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